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Abstract 
This essay argues that Hume’s political and historical thought is well 
read as skeptical and skeptical in a way that roots it deeply in the Hellenistic 
traditions of both Pyrrhonian and Academical thought. It deploys skeptical 
instruments to undermine political rationalism as well as theologically and 
metaphysically political ideologies. (1) Hume’s is politics of opinion (doxa) 
and (2) appearance (phainomena). It labors to oppose faction and enthusiasm 
and generate (3) suspension (epochê), (4) balance (isosthenia), (5) tranquility 
(ataraxia), and (6) moderation (metriopatheia, moderatio). Because Hume 
advocate the use of reflectively generated but epistemically and metaphysically 
suspensive general rules, his political thought is not intrinsically conservative. 
While it valorizes stability and peace, Humean politics accepts a contested and 
open-ended (zetesis) political order, one that requires continuous maintenance 
and revision but does not pretend to any ultimate or final progress or end.
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Resumen
Este ensayo pretende demostrar que el pensamiento político e histórico de 
Hume se interpreta bien cuando se lo lee como escéptico, y de un escepticismo 
que hunde sus raíces en las tradiciones helenísticas tanto del pensamiento 
académico como del pirrónico. Despliega instrumentos escépticos que socavan 
tanto el racionalismo político como las ideologías políticas de base metafísica o 
teológica. (1) La de Hume es una política de la opinión (doxa) y (2) la apariencia 
(phainomena). Trabaja para oponerse a la facción y al entusiasmo y generar (3) 
suspensión (epochê), (4) balance (isosthenia), (5) tranquilidad (ataraxia), y (6) 
moderación (metriopatheia, moderatio). A causa de la defensa de Hume del uso de 
reglas generales producidas de forma reflexiva, pero que suspenden compromisos 
epistémicos o metafísicos, su pensamiento político no es intrínsecamente 
conservador. Mientras que valora la estabilidad y la paz, la política humeana 
acepta un orden político de confrontación abierta (zetesis), un orden que requiere 
de un mantenimiento continuo y de revisiones, pero que no pretende un progreso 
o fin último o definitivo.
Palabras-clave: David Hume, escepticismo, Pirronismo, Academicismo, 
teoría política, filosofía moderna.
In this essay, I wish to argue that Hume’s political and historical thought 
is well read as skeptical and skeptical in a way that roots it deeply in the 
Hellenistic traditions of both Pyrrhonian and Academical thought. The very 
idea that Hume’s philosophical and political thought is connected is itself 
not uncontroversial. T. H. Grose saw in Hume a decisive turn away from 
philosophy when Hume began writing essays and history.2 Neil McArthur 
runs to the negative evidence of Hume’s text when he observes that “there is 
not a single passage where” Hume “explicitly extends his scepticism to the 
realm of politics.”3 Andrew Sabl argues that while Hume may be a skeptic 
in philosophy, he is an empirical scientist in matters of politics and history: 
“Hume’s political writings,” Sabl writes, “and above all his History, are 
empirical enquiries modeled at least loosely on modern science.”4 Petr Lom 
has argued that skepticism, including Hume’s, has itself properly no political 
import whatsoever, and that politics only seeps into skepticism at the limits of 
doubt.5 I wish to argue in this section that these thinkers are mistaken and that 
Hume’s historical and political thought shows not only how deeply connected it 
is to his own idiosyncratic skeptical philosophy but also describes the contours 
2  Grose (1889), 3.75-76; cited by McCormick (2013), 77.
3  McArthur (2007), 117.
4  Sabl (2015), 149; Cf. Sabl (2012).
5  Lom (2010).
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of skeptical philosophy more generally. It should not be surprising that this is 
so if one considers proper what James Harris recommends, namely that we 
read Hume’s “History not as an exercise in belles lettres that Hume turned to 
once his most important work was done, but, instead, as the culmination and 
crowning glory of Hume’s career as a philosophical analyst of the age in which 
he lived.”6 
The idea that Hume advances a skeptical politics, of course, is not entirely 
new. Duncan Forbes in his monumental Hume’s Philosophical Politics (1975), 
writes about Hume as a “sceptical Whig.”7 In this, Forbes draws from Hume’s 
remark in a 9 February 1748 letter to his cousin, Henry Home (Lord Kames), 
the same year he would publish the first Enquiry. There Hume says in the 
context of a discussion of the Protestant Succession that he is “a Whig, but 
a very sceptical one.”8 Forbes, however, calls Hume not only a skeptical but 
also a “scientific” Whig, a characterization he had previously made of Adam 
Smith and John Millar, because, in contrast to “vulgar” Whigs, Hume is 
“cosmopolitan” and supports the parliamentary mixed monarchy then thought 
to be modern in British politics—and also, of course, because Hume develops 
a general political theory or science.9 Hume is a “sceptical Whig” for Forbes 
moreover because Hume rejects what Forbes, in an allusion to Bacon, calls 
Whiggism’s parochial ideological “idols”—namely the idea that all monarchial 
systems are illegitimate, that the Stuart monarchs were uniformly wicked, that 
there was no liberty under the French monarchs, and that political obligation 
can only be grounded in consent of the governed of the sort described by social 
contract theory.10 
Eugene F. Miller in 1985 interpreted Hume’s political writing in the 
Essays as an extension into common life of his abstract philosophical theories, 
a line of continuity he shares with Donald W. Livingston.11 With Marie Martin, 
Livingston argues in their collection for the general vision of Hume as a 
philosopher of culture, politics, and history rather than merely epistemology 
and science.12 More recently, James Wiley has argued that “rather than being 
something Hume takes up after abandoning serious philosophy, humanist and 
literary concerns”—which for Wiley include political concerns—these “derive 
from Hume’s ‘skeptical’ philosophy.”13 John Christian Laursen has argued that 
6  Harris (2007), 336.
7  Forbes (1975), 139-40, 299.
8  Hume, Letters (1932); 1:111, #62; hereafter “LT.”
9  Forbes (1975), 140; Forbes (1954); Forbes (1978).
10  Forbes (1975), 299.
11  Miller’s introduction to Hume’s Essays (1985), xviii; cited by McCormick (2013), 78. Especially 
Livingston (1998).
12  Livingston & Martin (1991).
13  Wiley (2012), 16. In Wiley’s reading, Hume’s skepticism largely serves a negative function, 
clearing out metaphysics and religion to make room for what he calls a humanistic practice. In my 
reading, Hume’s skepticism, of course, is congruent with his humanism. His speculative anatomy, that 
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Hume’s philosophy of custom and habit, especially in his focuses on opinion 
and politeness/manners, defines the skeptical dimensions of his politics.14 
Miriam Schleifer McCormick has agreed that “there is a unity between 
Hume’s philosophical reflection and his political views…” and that “the 
conclusions Hume reaches in his political writings are natural outgrowths of his 
skepticism”—not unlike the way for Hume one kind of mitigated Academical 
skepticism may be thought of as the “natural” outgrowth of Pyrrhonian doubt.15 
McCormick argues, like Forbes, that Hume’s political skepticism is evident in 
his critiques of theories of (i) political legitimacy and (ii) obligation, but she also 
stresses (iii) his moderation, (iv) his acceptance of limited inquiry, and (v) his 
opposition to faction, as well as (vi) his support for American independence. As 
a skeptic, she writes, Hume holds that “our most basic beliefs” about politics, 
every bit as much as about natural science, “are grounded in principles that lack 
rational foundation and that abstract reasoning can lead us to the brink of total 
skepticism,” that is, to the brink of a skeptical crisis of the sort he describes in 
the 1739 A Treatise of Human Nature.16
Ryu Susato has argued that Hume’s social-political-cultural outlook 
manifests a much broader “spirit of scepticism” that can be more precisely 
described by four characteristics: (i) Hume’s empirical naturalism, especially 
his anti-rationalist theory of association and opinion, which focuses on 
contingencies and diversity in both the social-political and natural orders; (ii) 
Hume’s “scepticism about the clear demarcation of various issues,” such as 
the limits of legislative power; (iii) his acceptance of the instability of opinion 
across politics and natural science such that “Hume naturally cannot uphold the 
attainability of eternal truth by reason; much less the perfectibility of human 
nature”; and (iv) Hume’s dialogical and ironic literary styles.17 Susato also 
connects Hume’s social political thought to skepticism through (v) his criticism 
of religion and his implicitly anti-religious naturalistic secularism.
It is true that Hume sounds a defensive note, distancing his History from 
skepticism (though perhaps he dissimulates) when he writes to John Clephane 
on 1 September 1754 that: “I composed [the History of Great Britain] ad 
populum, as well as ad clerum, and thought, that scepticism was not in its place 
in an historical production” (LT 1.189, #93). Others, however, among Hume’s 
epistolary remarks take on a different valence. In addition to Hume’s 1748 
skeptical self-description in his letter to Kames, Susato locates a remark in a 
is, informs his moral or humane painting: “An anatomist, however, is admirably fitted to give advice 
to a painter; and ’tis even impracticable to excel in the latter art, without the assistance of the former” 
(T 3.3.6.6, SBN 620-621). Harris suggests Alexander Pope’s An Essay on Man (1733-34) may have 
had some influence on Hume’s project as an anatomist; Harris (2015) 82.
14  Laursen (2011b), 90ff., 94ff.
15  McCormick (2013), 78. Hume (2000), 12.3.25, SBN 162; hereafter, “E.”
16  Hume (2007), 1.4.7; hereafter, “T.”
17  Susato (2015), 12, 17-20.
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12 September 1754 letter to the Abbé le Blanc, notably the French translator 
of Hume’s Political Discourses, that seems suggestive: “The philosophical 
Spirit, which I have so much indulg’d in all my Writings, finds here” in the 
History of Great Britain, “ample Materials to work upon” (LT 1.193, #94).18 
If Hume’s philosophical spirit is indeed skeptical, and if that spirit pervades 
“all” his writings, then arguably he implies here that his History and political 
works are skeptical, too. Indeed, Hume includes history and political thought 
among those “subjects” he identifies as “... best adapted to the narrow capacity 
of human understanding” and “common life” (E 12.3.24-25). Importantly, he 
offers that catalog of subjects best adapted to the understanding and common 
life at the end of the first Enquiry just after characterizing himself as an 
Academic skeptic, writing that:
Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All 
deliberations in life regard the former; as also all disquisitions in history, 
chronology, geography, and astronomy. 
The sciences, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy … 
&c. where the qualities, causes, and effects of a whole species of objects are 
enquired into. (E 12.3.30-31)
Early on in Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779), 
politics is also collected along with natural science among investigations 
performed within the realm of common life: “So long as we confine our 
speculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or criticism, we make appeals, every 
moment, to common sense and experience, which strengthen our philosophical 
conclusions.”19 History and politics, in short, properly conceived, lie within the 
realm of inquiry permitted by Humean skepticism.
All this is right in Wiley, Laursen, Schleifer McCormick, Susato, et alia, 
but there is more. Scholarly interpretation continues to evolve, as Sabl, for 
example, has more recently modified his view to argue that Hume’s skepticism 
is evident in his social-political essays and his historical writing, though only 
in their formal and rhetorical qualities. Sabl now maintains at least “that 
skepticism is very helpful for understanding not the content of Hume’s political 
work but its form, its style, and its intended effect”—a style that Thomas Poole 
also recognizes as “sceptical” and “urbane.”20 Even McArthur concedes that 
at T 1.4.7.12 (SBN 270-71) Hume—just as he is emerging from his moment 
of skeptical crisis—at least points to a connection between his philosophical 
thinking and political matters when he observes that: 
18  Susato (2015), 13.
19  Hume (1947), 1.10; hereafter “D.”
20  Sabl (2015), 150. Poole (2015), 112.
376 Peter S. Fosl 
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 20, nº 40. 
Segundo semestre de 2018. Pp. 371-401.  ISSN 1575-6823  e-ISSN 2340-2199  doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2018.i40.17
I cannot forbear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of moral 
good and evil, the nature and foundation of government, and the causes of those 
several passions and inclinations, which actuate and govern me. … I feel an 
ambition to arise in me of contributing to the instruction of mankind….21
But the way Hume’s politics have been described as skeptical has been 
insufficient to its task, not only because more attention is warranted to the content 
of Hume’s social-political thought but also and more particularly because of the 
inadequate way Hume’s thought has been situated in the skeptical traditions. 
I wish to change that here by offering a more extensive account of Hume’s 
political skepticism that places him more deeply in skeptical philosophy. In 
particular, in what remains of this essay, I wish (1) to describe how Hume’s political 
thought conforms to both Pyrrhonian and Academical skepticism, and I wish to use 
those findings to resolve a number of persistent interpretive puzzles, as well as to 
explicate what for Hume composes a distinctively skeptical political philosophy 
per se. In particular, I wish to address (2) the extent to which it is proper to read 
Hume as a conservative or a more progressive thinker. I wish to explain in addition 
how (3) Hume resolves the skeptical apraxia problem in political terms so that he 
can not only make normative prescriptions about political conduct, even political 
resistance, but also develop (4) a prescriptive political science. Hume does so 
through what I will described as a philosophy of “critical habits and customs.”
1. How Can Politics Be Skeptical at All? 
Thomas Merrill reads Hume’s skeptical turn to politics by analogy with 
the Socratic turn to the human and the political from the natural philosophy of 
the pre-Socratics.22 Exceeding Sabl’s recognition of Pyrrhonian form, Merrill 
writes that Hume’s work on politics and history: 
… does partake of classic skeptical styles and methods. It is in Hume’s Essays 
and History that we find the reporter of all sides, the doubter of exclusive claims, 
the distruster of systems, the person determined to find some possible truth in a 
variety of viewpoints and exclusive and absolute truth in none. We also find, to 
21  McArthur (2007), 5; cited by Susato (2015), 12.
22  Merrill (2015a), Chapter 1, “Hume’s Socratism”; cf. Merrill (2015b). Merrill writes that he 
uses Hume’s “Socratic reference” (T Intro. 7, SBN xvi-xvii) connecting him to Socrates’s turn from 
pre-Socratic natural philosophy to social-political topics “as a means of thinking about Hume’s 
skepticism.” Merrill claims “that Hume’s ‘science of human nature’ is a political science that attempts 
to understand moral and political opinion from the inside” of common life. Merrill is alive to this 
Socratic dimension of Hume’s thought but not to the way it connects it to Pyrrhonian skepticism and 
the Pyrrhonian Fourfold. Merrill, however, is not hostile to a skeptical reading of politics, Socratism 
is in many ways skeptical. For Merrill while there maybe, provisional progress, there remains 
background aporia; Merrill (2015b), 25. I am grateful for Merrill’s comments on this material.
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a surprising degree, someone who both aspired to and hoped to evoke in others 
the Pyrrhonian elements that have precisely been noted as absent in Hume’s 
Treatise: suspension of judgment (epoché) and tranquility (ataraxia).23
Let us examine Hume’s use of “skeptical styles and methods” more closely 
and more extensively as well as what else of skepticism Hume “hoped” to “evoke.”
1.1. The Politics of Doxa
It is on the issue of the limits of knowledge in politics possible for humans 
that F. A. Hayek connects Hume’s skepticism to his political theory.24 And, indeed, 
skepticism centers on doxa (opinion) rather than epistemê (knowledge). Like 
skeptical Humean science, Hume analyzes politics skeptically as a form of doxa 
and criticizes it when it is dogmatic.25 In his 1741 essay, “Of the First Principles 
of Government,” an essay that appears on the heels of the 1739-40 Treatise, 
Hume writes that it “is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded.”26 
Moreover, while considerations of “interest” figure prominently in Hume’s 
analyses of social-political matters—e.g. in the genesis of rules of justice—Hume 
is clear that by “interest” he means people’s opinions of their interest: “though 
men be much governed by interest; yet even interest itself, and all human affairs, 
are entirely governed by opinion” (ES 51). Hume’s analysis of the bounds of 
legislative authority is typical when he observes that making that demarcation 
“is the work more of imagination and passion than of reason” (T 3.2.10.14; SBN 
560-61).27 Moreover, as Susato rightly concludes, Hume’s acknowledgement 
of the contingency, variability, and indeterminacy of opinion “is central to his 
system of ‘the science of MAN’ and his Sceptical Enlightenment.”28 Politics is 
for Hume doxa all the way down.
23  Sabl (2015), 151.
24  Hayek (1966), 342: Hume’s political ideas “are most intimately connected with his general 
philosophical conceptions, especially with his sceptical views on the ‘narrow bounds of human 
understanding’.”
25  Marie Martin finds in Hume’s repudiation of knowledge as basic to moral life to be what 
distinguishes him from the stoics; Martin (1994), 328-29; Wulf (2000), 98, discusses Martin and reads 
implications into this difference for a skeptical politics without appeal to knowledge.
26  Hume (1985), 32; hereafter, “ES.” Susato has it precisely backwards, then, when he reads Hume 
as transforming “doxa” so that it can be used in dogmatic political science. Susato writes: “For Hume, to 
recognize the central role of opinion in our everyday social and political life it was necessary to depart 
from the traditional (negative) connotations of the word ‘opinion’ as doxa, which should be eradicated 
or suppressed to read the truth”; Susato (2015), 70. Rather, I wish to argue, Hume’s use of doxa is part of 
his transforming political science in a skeptical way so that it suspends judgment on questions of ultimate 
truth. Susato follows C. B. Macpherson in suspecting the source of Hume’s view about government 
being rooted in opinion to be William Temple’s “An Essay upon the Original and Nature of Government” 
(1679), along with Hobbes, Locke, Bayle, and Shaftesbury; Macpherson, indeed, describes Temple as 
“the Hume of the seventeenth century”; Susato (2015), 60ff.
27  Susato (2015), 69.
28  Susato (2015), 72.
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1.2. Pyrrhonian Politics, Revolution, and Cartesianism 
In addition to being a matter of doxa, Hume’s political thinking is 
ephectic, that is suspensive, and non-apprehensive in that Hume refuses any 
metaphysical grounding to the political order.29 Just as Hume skeptically 
refuses metaphysics and ultimate rational justification for belief, scientific and 
otherwise, he refuses rational and metaphysical grounding for government 
and society. That includes for Hume grounding the political in a divine origin 
(apprehended by revelation or otherwise), natural law (especially a natural 
law grounded in divine law), natural rights (endowed in people by a creator 
or otherwise), and the false philosophical fictions of an original contract or an 
ancient constitution. In Hume’s February 1748 letter to Kames, he not only 
declares that he is a skeptical Whig. After acknowledging his understanding of 
the social and political punishment he faces as a skeptic about the Protestant 
Succession, he also confesses his having epistemically apprehended nothing 
about it and perhaps nothing regarding politics and other matters at all: “Some 
people would frighten me with the consequences that may attend this candour, 
considering my present station, but I own I cannot apprehend anything” (LT 
1.111, #62). 
So much is especially clear in Hume’s refusing what might be called 
metaphysical politics. In political thinking, just as in natural science and 
metaphysics, Hume resists philosophical posits not grounded in experience or 
common life that would pretend to legitimate authority and obligation in an a 
priori and summarily universal way. He also rejects a conception of reasoning 
capable of establishing autonomously and independently political authority and 
legitimacy.
In a memorable and trenchant phrase, Livingston describes one of the 
principal kinds of political thinking Hume opposes, “political Cartesianism,” 
a species of political theorizing that pretends to operate from something like 
what Thomas Nagel has called a “view from nowhere”—a commanding, 
detached position that speciously claims to have transcended the “gross earthy 
mixture” (T 1.4.7.14, SBN 272) of “common life.”30 In Pyrrhonian terms, 
political Cartesianism marks the philosophical pretense of operating beyond 
the “Fourfold” of appearances (phainomena) and common life (bios, ho bios 
ho koinos)—nature, the passions, custom, and technai.31 This “false” and 
pathological species of political philosophy postures as if it were characterized 
29  About epochê see Cicero’s Academica (ACD 1.12.45) and Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism (PH 1.3.7). About non-apprehension, see PH 1.1.3-4.
30  Livingston (1984), Chapter 12; and see especially “Cartesianism in Politics,” 275-78. Nagel 
(1986); Nagel plays off Spinoza’s recommendation to regard the world “sub specie aeternitatis,” 
under the aspect of eternity (Ethics II, prop. 44).
31  Sextus Empiricus (1976), 1.11.23, 1.11.21, 1.34.237; hereafter, “PH.”
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by absolute (i) autonomy and independence from history, culture, opinion, and 
nature. It moreover makes claim to its own overriding (ii) authority so that it 
is warranted in pronouncing judgments upon common life in particular and in 
toto: “False philosophy has many forms ranging from religious superstition to 
metaphysics, but they are all cases of seeking, by way of the autonomy principle, 
some Archimedean point outside the prejudices and customs of common life 
from which the order as a whole can be judged.”32 This “false” kind of thinking 
is Cartesian in Livingston’s view, since it is closely connected to Descartes’s 
announced aspiration to “deconstruct” the whole of his past beliefs (scientific, 
ordinary, moral, etc.) in favor of what his detached, autonomous, and solitary 
cogito—with its self-generated, self-verifying method—would authorize and 
establish. 
Livingston rightly understands that Descartes’s gesture is more than 
epistemically self-deluding. False philosophy and religion are politically 
dangerous, as well. Because they authorize through their mad “philosophical 
melancholy and delirium” (T 1.4.7.9, SBN 269)  radical and totalized judgments, 
they legitimize the most extreme forms of conduct—conduct contrary to 
common practices, as well as a purportedly “total” kind of revolution. They 
warrant, that is, aspirations to the wholesale overturning of the beliefs and 
practices of custom and history in favor of the ideal “plans of imaginary 
republics” spun from free-floating philosophical reason—as if doing so were 
possible: “Harrington’s Oceana was well adapted to that age, when the plans 
of imaginary republics were daily subjects of debate and conversation…. The 
idea, however, of a perfect and immortal commonwealth will always be found 
as chimerical as that of a perfect and immortal man.”33 About totalized and 
extreme political projects, Hume is deeply skeptical. There is something like 
Albert Camus’s thinking in Hume’s resistance to abstruse political theory and 
ideology—a resistance to the murderous ideologies Camus condemns in the 
L’homme révolté (1951) and in “Ni Victimes, ni bourreaux” (1946), as well 
as those who subscribe to them with “absolute certainty.” Abstruse ideology 
is itself dangerous, and its malignancies are precisely the sort that skepticism 
practiced politically aims to remedy.
1.3. Political Isosthenia, Ataraxia, and Moderatio 
Roger Eichorn has rightly argued that Pyrrhonism properly leads to “a 
healthy degree of moderation” in politics, and in line with this assessment 
Hume advances in opposition to the political effects of false philosophy and 
religion both ataraxia (tranquility and peace, PH 1.12.25) and metriopatheia 
32  Livingston (1984), 6.
33  Hume (1983), 6.62.153; hereafter “H.”
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or moderatio (moderate emotion).34 Epochê is itself a kind of stillness, and the 
resulting ataraxia is a serenity of soul Sextus compares to the stillness of the sea 
(galene), a metaphor that connects back to Hume’s important and well-known 
self-description of his faculties as a “leaky weather-beaten vessel” (T 1.4.7.1, 
SBN 263). Sextus writes: “‘Suspense’ [epochê] is a state of mental rest [stasis 
dianoias] owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything. ‘Quietude’ 
[ataraxia] is an untroubled and tranquil [galenotes] condition of soul” (PH 
1.4.10). In cases where some disturbance is “unavoidable,” “moderate passion” 
or emotion (metriopatheia, in Latin moderatio) will do (PH 1.12.25), for 
Pyrrhonians as well as Academics.35
In the Treatise, Hume makes a plea for the ataractic submission to 
customary government against philosophical inquiries into the origins of a 
polity that would threaten to undermine its legitimacy: “No maxim is more 
conformable, both to prudence and morals, than to submit quietly to the 
government, which we find establish’d in the country where we happen to 
live, without enquiring too curiously into its origin and first establishment. 
Few governments will bear being examin’d so rigorously” (T 3.2.10.7, SBN 
558). Baxter rightly connects the dots with Academic skepticism in Hume 
and stability in epistemological matters, but it is so in for Hume’s political 
theory, as well. Baxter writes: “Precedence for seeking stability is found in 
Sextus’s discussion of the preference of the New Academy for ‘appearances 
which are plausible and scrutinized and undistractable,’ or, as [Benson] Mates 
translates it, ‘the phantasia that is plausible, tested, and stable” (PH 1.33.229, 
M 7.242-43).36
A reluctance simply to undermine is typical in Hume for reasons of 
Pyrrhonian isosthenia, too. Just as he does in the Dialogues concerning Natural 
Religion, in his histories and essays Hume is often at pains to balance the various 
sides of an issue and to do so charitably. Sabl is right that like Sextus, Bayle, 
and other Academics, Hume commonly if not universally writes as a reporter 
of the various sides of an issue rather than as a advocate for a specific side. 
His objective is not only to dissimulate, as he likely does sometimes, but also 
to sympathize with the various parties and to present their ideas contextually 
even if critically.37 Hume’s aim is not only to achieve what isosthenia (PH 
1.22.196) or balancing is possible but also to reveal the logical vulnerabilities 
of competing positions in a way that diffuses the powerful emotions those 
positions potentially generate. John Immerwahr suggests that Hume develops 
34  Eichorn (2014), 142-43. Quoted by Laursen (2016), 19. Wulf argues that caution as a political 
principle, especially for political advisers, is also characteristic of Hume’s moderate skepticism; Wulf 
(2000), 86ff. 89ff. For a reading of Hume as a cautious and conservative skeptic, see Letwin (1965).
35  See Immerwahr (1992) on Hume’s various strategies to tranquilize the passions.
36  Baxter (2008), 101n16. See Mates (1996). On the Academics and what they find plausible or 
pithane, see: Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos, M 7.242-43. Cited conventionally as “M.”
37  See Herdt (1997) on this kind of critical sympathy.
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a strategy for tranquilizing politics by what he calls “moderation through 
opposition,” diffusing “passion with passion,” as it were via a kind of political 
isosthenia.38 Hume does so with religions, too.39 Hume labors along these lines 
towards the Pyrrhonian telos of peace and social concourse, just the sort of safe 
disagreement the theological opponents Philo and Cleanthes are able to reach 
in Part 12 of the Dialogues.
Hume balances one dogmatism against another, and he defuses their 
violent potentials not only through charitable and sympathetic reportage but 
also through waves of skeptical argument. As Richard Dees observes, Hume’s 
skepticism in the Dialogues about metaphysical questions and the capacities 
of the human mind to settle them is resolved not in favor of a demonstrable, 
universally accepted conclusion but rather sociability, “friendship,” and 
neutralized potential violence.40 It is a practice of writing that is therapeutic 
both as an example and in its logic. Hume’s Philo observes: 
That the dispute concerning Theism … is merely verbal, or perhaps, if possible, 
still more incurably ambiguous, will appear upon the slightest enquiry. … 
The Theist allows, that the original intelligence is very different from human 
reason: The Atheist allows, that the original principle of order bears some 
remote analogy to it. Will you quarrel, Gentlemen, about the degrees, and enter 
into a controversy, which admits not of any precise meaning, nor consequently 
of any determination? (D 12.7)41
Sam Hall puts it well when he writes about Part 12 of the Dialogues: 
“Hume’s political message is the exemplary performance, and endorsement as 
ideal, of the life that his characters share, despite their disagreements.”42
In matters of state, Hume is like other early modern liberal theorists insofar 
as his objective is peace or political ataraxia. Though Hume says Hobbes’s 
political is “fitted only to promote tyranny” (H 6.42.153), when Hobbes 
describes the pre-social bellum omnium contra omnes or war of all against all, 
his objective is clearly on the contrary to overcome it.43 So it is, too, for Locke 
38  Immerwahr (1992), 304.
39  Immerwahr (1994).
40  Dees (2002).
41  Wright draws a connection between Hume’s remark about the question of the deity’s existence 
being a merely “verbal” dispute and a similarly skeptical remark by Ralph Cudworth concerning 
arguments about the ta adêla of natural powers: the “Controversie whether the Energy of the Plastick 
Nature, be Cogitation, or no, seems to be but a Logomachy, or Contention about Words”; Wright 
(1983), 171. As this passage was a late addition to the 1779 edition of Hume’s Dialogues, one may 
think of it as “Hume’s final attempt to clarify the character and import of his scepticism”; Harris 
(2015), 570n212.
42  Clark (2013), 72.
43  In De Cive (1651), Chapter 1, Paragraph 12, Hobbes writes: “it cannot be deny’d but that the 
naturall state of men, before they entr’d into Society, was a meer War, and that not simply, but a War 
of all men, against all men.” Hume does not seem to think it possible for human beings to exist in a 
non-social condition, but he also thinks that without rules of justice humans will sink into a condition 
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and Rousseau; both labor in towards the goal of ending or at least mitigating 
conflict and social discord. Adam Ferguson and Karl Marx, in contrast, argue 
that conflict is a good, though Marx remains committed to the liberal idea of 
finally overcoming it, too. It would take an anti-liberal like Carl Schmitt to 
argue for war as a social good.44 
As a skeptic, however, Hume is unlike other liberal theorists because he 
is not concerned with the establishment of a political ideal or defending the 
conclusions of a dogmatic political science. For that reason interpreters have 
often been confounded by the facility with which he seems to endorse and 
criticize both Tory and Whiggish ideas. History, in fact, yields the skeptical 
lesson that the political ideals for which philosophers contend produce discord 
without end. Tranquility and liberty are the fruits of true skeptical political 
philosophy, and they prove in experience more important than realizing 
theoretical ideals:
the study of history confirms the reasonings of true philosophy; which, shewing 
us the original qualities of human nature, teaches us to regard the controversies 
in politics as incapable of any decision in most cases, and as entirely subordinate 
to the interests of peace and liberty. (T 3.2.10.15, SBN 562)
For Hume, the principal political adversary is conflict itself, especially, 
during the historical moment in which he lived, “faction.” In his essay, “That 
Politics May Be Reduced to a Science,” for example, Hume writes that: 
“There are enow of zealots on both sides who kindle up the passions of their 
partizans, and under pretence of public good, pursue the interests and ends of 
their particular faction. For my part, I shall always be more fond of promoting 
moderation than zeal,” though he allows there—skeptical as he is even of a 
purely anti-zealous position—that measured zeal for the public good may be 
desirable (ES 27). In “Of Parties in General,” Hume elaborates further on the 
danger faction poses: “Factions subvert government, render laws impotent, and 
beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same nation, who ought to 
give mutual assistance and protection to each other” (ES 55). They also aid 
the enemy and distort clear thinking. Although usurper Henry I was flawed in 
many ways, according to Hume the “chief merit of this monarch’s government 
consists in the profound tranquility, which he established and maintained 
throughout all his dominions during the greater part of his reign” (H 1.6.273).
similar to the one Hobbes describes. He even uses Hobbes’s phrase in saying so: “Human nature 
cannot, by any means, subsist, without the association of individuals; and that association never could 
have place, were no regard paid to the laws of equity and justice. Disorder, confusion, the war of all 
against all, are the necessary consequences of such a licentious conduct”; Hume (1998), 4.3, SBN 
206, emph. mine; hereafter “EM.”
44  Schmitt (1927).
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Nevertheless, Hume does, in “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” 
develop his own “imaginary republic” (ES 514), one in part inspired by James 
Harrington’s 1656 Oceana. Hume’s model, however, unlike Harrington’s, is 
best read as a contingent skeptical instrument of faction management rather 
than as a representation of a purportedly eternal truth revealed by empirical or a 
priori political science; and it is in this skeptical sense, more precisely than Sabl 
recognizes, that Hume may be said to take a “technological attitude towards 
politics.”45 (The observance of technai is, of course, one of the components of 
the Pyrrhonian Fourfold.) Moreover, it is by the use of skepticism in politics in 
this more extensive way than Forbes realizes that Hume wishes to educate the 
Hanoverian court.46 Hume’s overriding concern is evident when he remarks at 
the close of the essay:
I would only persuade men not to contend, as if they were fighting pro arts & 
focis [for altars and hearths], and change a good constitution into a bad one, by 
the violence of their factions. (ES 31)
Various political arrangements can be good or bad, including his, but 
that is no reason not to offer a plan for contemporary society (and ideal 
commonwealth) that solves the problems that confront it. The key is to consider 
the ideal in a skeptical spirit. No such plan is for the Humean true skeptic an 
eternal truth. 
A Byzantine machine, Hume’s republic carefully arranges its parts to 
establish a complex and redundant system of checks and balances designed 
to cancel out faction through political isosthenia in order to cultivate social 
ataraxia and moderated political passions. For that reason, Hume’s essay is 
often compared with James Madison’s Federalist Papers #10, which is focused 
upon the same anti-factional end.47 Hume’s advances a republican model and 
that not because it satisfies some a priori ideal of the political good but rather 
because: “Though it is more difficult to form a republican government in an 
extensive country than in a city; there is more facility, when once it is formed, 
of preserving it steady and uniform, without tumult and faction” (ES, 527). 
That is in part so because the “differences of moral sentiment, which naturally 
arise from a republican or monarchical government, are also very obvious; as 
well as those which proceed from general riches or poverty, union or faction, 
ignorance or learning” (EM Dialogue 51, SBN 340-41). 
45  Sabl (2015), 163.
46  Forbes (1975), Chapter 3, “Political Obligations for ‘Moderate Men’,” 91ff.
47  Adair (1956/57). Adair writes about Federalist 10 that Madison was “not only using the 
behavioral science techniques of the eighteenth century, but turning to the writings of David Hume 
himself for some of the suggestions concerning an extended republic”; as reprinted in Livingston & 
King (1976), 408.
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The balancing method of Hume’s skeptical writing about politics also 
shows itself in his dyad of essays, “Of the Original Contract” and “Of Passive 
Obedience,” written shortly after the Jacobite uprising of 1745.48 In the first, 
Hume undermines the social contract theory of obligation characteristic of 
Whigs and liberals, in the second the passive obedience theory of the Tories. 
On the one hand, social contract theory is a fiction that itself presumes prior 
agreement. On the other hand, while in general Hume conservatively aligns 
himself with standing authority, he understands from a “pragmatic and sceptical” 
perspective that passive obedience sometimes runs up against nature and human 
beings’ opinions concerning their own interest: “’Tis certain, therefore, that in 
all our notions of morals we never entertain such an absurdity as that of passive 
obedience, but make allowances for resistance in the more flagrant instances 
of tyranny and oppression” (T 3.2.9.4, SBN 552).49 Indeed, there seems in 
general in the essays, and in particular in “Of Liberty and Despotism,” to be 
“a striking scepticism as to the ultimate importance of the distinction between 
‘free’ governments and absolute ones.”50
On the one side of the balance, Hume sets himself for the sake of ataraxia 
in a stance inclining towards allegiance to standing authority: “I must confess, 
that I shall always incline to their side, who draw the bond of allegiance very 
close, and consider an infringement of it, as the last refuge in desperate cases, 
when the public is in the highest danger, from violence and tyranny” (ES 489; 
“Of Passive Obedience”).51 In the History, just after discussing the regicide of 
Charles I without praise for those who toppled him and with apparent sympathy 
for the monarch, Hume recommends “hiding the truth from the populace” of 
“the doctrine of resistance” (H 5.544). 
On the other side, Hume there in the History affirms that the doctrine 
of resistance is “the truth,” and in doing so he does just the opposite of 
concealing it.52 Hume accepts rebellion and revolution in highly constrained 
48  Although this dyad was incorporated as seemingly a dialectical pair into the 1748 “Third 
Edition, Corrected” of Essays, Moral and Political, the two were also published with a third essay, 
“Of National Characters,” in a stand alone volume in Edinburgh and London that same year as Three 
Essays, Moral and Political (Andrew Millar & Alexander Kincaid).
49  Harris (2015), 236.
50  Harris (2015), 184. The essay, “Of Civil Liberty,” was originally titled “Of Liberty and 
Despotism,” and the various editions of his essays between 1741 and 1754 bear the original title. 
There Hume also in the revised essay commonly substituted “absolutism” for “despotism.”
51  Laursen (2010) identifies a string of moderate or, in his terms, “tame” skeptics who emerged in 
Germany in the late eighteenth century. These thinkers advocated skepticism about epistemological 
matters, moderation of the passions, but took no issue with the status quo of society: Louis de 
Beausobre, author of Le Pyrrhonisme du Sage (1754), renamed Le Pyrrhonisme raisonnable (1755); 
Jean Bernard Mérian, author of “Sur le phénoménisme de David Hume”; and Louis Frédéric Ancillon, 
author of “Dialogue entre Berkeley et Hume” (1799), “Doutes sur les bases du calcul des probabilités.” 
Laursen argues that these authors demonstrate that skepticism may be neither conservative nor 
subversive but merely passive in the face of the status quo. On Mérian’s essay on Hume, see Laursen 
and Popkin (1997).
52  Merrill dissects this curious, ironic, and paradoxical moment in Merrill (2005).
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circumstances: “our submission to government admits of exceptions, and 
that an egregious tyranny in the rulers is sufficient to free the subjects from 
all ties of allegiance” (T 3.2.9.1, SBN 549). Hume offers implicit support 
to the Glorious Revolution when he calls the settled regime that followed 
“if not the best system of government, at least the most entire system of 
liberty that ever was known amongst mankind” (H 6.71.531; cf. 2.23.525). 
Hume cites Spain’s Philip II and the Roman emperors, Nero and Dionysius (T 
3.2.9.4, SBN 552; ES 426), as well as Tiberius, Caligula, Domitian (ES 94), 
Nabis, and Agathocles (ES 409-10) as rulers so exceptionally tyrannical as to 
warrant their overthrow.
Accordingly we may observe, that this is both the general practice and principle 
of mankind, and that no nation, that cou’d find any remedy, ever yet suffer’d 
the cruel ravages of a tyrant, or were blam’d for their resistance. Those who 
took up arms against Dionysius or Nero, or Philip the second, have the favour 
of every reader in the perusal of their history; and nothing but the most violent 
perversion of common sense can ever lead us to condemn them. (T 3.2.9.4, 
SBN 552)
There are for Hume limits to obedience. Sounding almost like a liberal 
ideologue, Hume writes in Book 3 of the Treatise: “in the case of enormous 
tyranny and oppression, ’tis lawful to take arms even against supreme power; 
and that as government is a mere human invention for mutual advantage and 
security, it no longer imposes any obligation, either natural or moral, when 
once it ceases to have that tendency” (T 3.2.10.16, SBN 563). And furthermore: 
“Those, therefore, who wou’d seem to respect our free government, and yet 
deny the right of resistance, have renounc’d all pretensions to common sense, 
and do not merit a serious answer” (T 3.2.10.16, SBN 564). 
Perhaps it is proper, as James Harris puts it, to think of Hume the political 
skeptic as “defining and developing a philosophy of politics that was as 
sceptical about the myths of Whiggism as it was about the myths of Toryism.”53 
On the other hand, Thomas Merrill sees a deeper point of political philosophy 
made in Hume’s “playful” and seemingly contrary rhetoric concerning these 
questions: “Hume’s playful rhetoric thus leads into his view of the deeper 
paradoxes within every political society” concerning authority and liberty, as 
well as ideal perfections and practical limitations—contradictions or tensions, 
one might say, that skepticism is well placed to handle.54
53  Harris (2015), 131.
54  Merrill (2005), 259. The rhetoric also, in Merrill’s formulation, achieves the delicate political 
objective of keeping “the right of rebellion in the public mind without encouraging its exercise” (282). 
This would have been especially important to Hume since in his own historical moment, the right of 
rebellion was most likely to be exercised by Jacobites, whom Hume opposed.
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Hume’s criticisms are not advanced in the service of a new and different 
political dogma but rather for the sake of skeptical ataraxia and metriopatheia.55 
In the very next essay after these two balancing poles, Hume describes in 
“Of the Coalition of Parties” his method in terms of balancing and moderate 
emotion directly in conjunction with skepticism about reason:
 
There is not a more effectual method of promoting so good an end than to 
prevent all unreasonable insult and trump of one party over the other, to 
encourage moderate opinions, to find the proper medium in all disputes, to 
persuade each that its antagonist may possibly be sometimes in the right, and 
to keep a balance in the praise and blame, which we bestow on either side. The 
two former Essays, concerning the original contract and passive obedience, 
are calculated for this purpose with regard to the philosophical and practical 
controversies between the parties, and tend to show that neither side are in these 
respects so fully supported by reason as they endeavour to flatter themselves. 
We shall proceed to exercise the same moderation with regard to the historical 
disputes between the parties, by proving that each of them was justified by 
plausible topics; that there were on both sides wise men, who meant well to 
their country; and that the past animosity between the factions had no better 
foundation than narrow prejudice or interested passion.56 (ES, 494)
At the closing of the History of England he writes:
And forgetting that a regard to liberty, though a laudable passion, ought 
commonly to be subordinate to a reverence for established government, the 
prevailing faction has celebrated only the partisans of the former, who pursued 
as their object the perfection of civil society, and has extolled them at the 
expense of their antagonists, who maintained those maxims, that are essential 
to its very existence. But extremes of all kinds are to be avoided; and though no 
one will ever please either faction by moderate opinions, it is there we are most 
likely to meet with truth and certainty. (H 6.71.533-34)
If not truth, then at least moderation offers what is useful, stable, durable, 
and satisfactory to the best demands of human scrutiny. 
Without connecting Hume’s strategy to skeptical practice, Duncan 
Forbes offers this otherwise insightful summary of it: “Whig theory and 
the conscientious scruples of Jacobites are both condemned by a political 
55  Merrill reads Hume’s skeptical questioning as a means of forging a political science that makes 
a space for the radical questioning of skepticism; e.g. Merrill (2015b), 26: “Hume’s intention is not 
simply to promote moderation, as important as that is. He also makes an argument about why radical 
questioning is necessary for politics and even attractive for its own sake.” Merrill is right that Hume’s 
radical questioning serves political ends (though, as we have seen, sometimes not questioning does, 
too). I wish to stress a deep continuity between Hume’s politics and his skepticism in what might 
be called skeptical political ends, ends that include moderation and ataraxia, as well as zetetic and 
critical questioning in the activity of methodizing and correcting. Skepticism informs Hume’s politics.
56  Quoted by Sabl (2015), 153.
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philosophy fashioned to meet the needs of forward-looking ‘moderate men’ in a 
modern progressive society.”57 As it is when dealing with dogmatism generally, 
says Sextus Empiricus (PH 1.12.25), in the tumult of political life “extremes of 
all kinds are to be avoided” in favor of “moderate opinion.” That may be the 
best that finite human beings can achieve.58
2. Customs, Toryism, and Conservatism 
Not everyone, however, has understood Hume to be a progressive thinker. 
Of course, neither “conservative” nor “progressive” were terms that Hume 
would have used to characterize his political views. Nevertheless, that Hume 
holds our lives to be grounded in habit, custom, and history has led a number 
of commentators to misunderstand him as a deeply conservative traditionalist 
of the same stream that produced Edmund Burke (1729-97) and arguably 
Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990).59 In Laurence Bongie’s phrase, for example, 
Hume is the “prophet of the counter-revolution,” since he precedes Burke.60 
Livingston, who wrote the foreword to the Liberty Fund’s reissue of Bongie’s 
volume, pursues a similar reading, calling Hume even “the first conservative 
philosopher.”61 It is an interpretation in my view, however, that misunderstands 
the normative and critical power of Hume’s thought, and it rests on a fallacy of 
false alternatives.
John Stuart Mill concluded that Hume’s “absolute skepticism in 
speculation very naturally brought him round to Toryism in practice….”62 Sir 
Leslie Stephen, who had done so much to define Hume to a British readership, 
accused Hume not only of a “heretical scepticism” that vitiated philosophy and 
history but also of a “cynical conservatism” that “inclines to the side of authority 
as the most favorable to that stagnation which is the natural ideal of a sceptic.”63 
Biographer James Harris acknowledges that “from early on Hume had been 
sceptical of the standard Whig view of the Stuarts as tyrannical usurpers.”64 
Thomas Jefferson is well known for having read Hume as an illiberal Tory, and 
57  Forbes (1975), 96.
58  Quoted by Wiley (2012), 154, cf. 292n121.
59  Burke (1790) and Oakeshott (2010) as well as Oakeshott (1947). See also Wolin (1954/1976).
60  Bongie (2002). See Resnick (1996). Cf. Mossner (1941).
61  Livingston (1984), 310.
62  Mill (1838), 10:80.
63  Stephen (1949), 181. See Wolin (1954/1976), 999, and Harris (2015), 7.
64  Harris (2015), 329. Harris also writes that Hume become increasingly doubtful about the Whig-
dominated political settlement to the Glorious Revolution. In the wake of the public disturbances 
following the 1768 elections, Hume became “even more sceptical about the balance struck between 
liberty and authority by the post-1688 constitution…” (409). Harris reads Hume’s despair over the 
British government’s ability to cope with its debts as “further reason” for Hume “to be sceptical of 
jingoistic celebrations of the virtues of British liberty” (425).
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in an 11 June 1807 letter to John Norvell Washington, Jefferson opined, for 
example, that: 
as we have employed some of the best materials of the British constitution 
in the construction of our own government, a knowledge of British history 
becomes useful to the American politician. There is, however, no general 
history of that country which can be recommended. The elegant one of Hume 
seems intended to disguise & discredit the good principles of the government, 
and is so plausible & pleasing in its style & manner, as to instil its errors & 
heresies insensibly into the minds of unwary readers.65 
To William Duane on 12 August 1810, Jefferson complained at a higher 
pitch that Hume’s History “has spread universal toryism over the land.”66 As 
Jefferson aged, his condemnations became more impassioned. On 25 November 
1816, Jefferson wrote to John Adams a remark that seems almost apoplectic: 
“This single book has done more to sap the free principles of the English 
Constitution than the largest standing army of which their patriots have been so 
jealous.”67 Jefferson and others who read Hume as a reactionary are mistaken.
In the Treatise and, as we have seen, in “Of the Original Contract” Hume 
does attack social contract theory, the darling of political liberals and Whigs, 
in its attempt to establish rationally the basis of state and social authority (T 
3.2.1-11, SBN 477-569).68 It is, indeed, in the context of refusing a contractual 
justification for the Glorious Revolution—the Whiggish justification—that in a 
letter to Kames he calls himself a “sceptical” Whig (LT 1:111, #62). Hume found 
Wilkes and the radical Whigs to be dangerous. Hume, yes, seems decidedly 
conservative, too, when he argues that “long possession” (T 3.2.10, SBN 556), 
simple “present possession” (T 3.2.10, SBN 557) and even “conquest” can 
establish sovereign authority over territory, especially once habits of obedience 
are in place. Not only limited government by consent but even “absolute 
government” (T 3.2.9, SBN 549) is legitimate, for Hume, a suggestion that is 
anathema to liberals. In a passage added to the essay “That Politics May Be 
Reduced to a Science” in the third (1748) edition of the Essays, Hume confirms 
the skeptical and anti-republican view that “ages of greatest public virtue are 
not always most eminent for private virtue” (ES 25).69 
Hume refuses the doctrine of Lockean or Jeffersonian natural rights, 
associated with liberals and so centrally important to them in leveraging political 
demands of the sort, for example, Thomas Paine advanced in The Rights of 
65  Jefferson (1807), 91.
66  Jefferson (1810), 293.
67  Jefferson (1816), 498-99.
68  See also Hume’s essay, “Of the Origin of Government” (ES, 37-41).
69  Harris (2015), 246. This is the wording of the 1748 edition. The 1777 edition has “ages of public 
spirit.”
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Man (1791). Indeed, although Thomas Jefferson misunderstood Hume as a 
Tory, he properly understood that Hume’s History of England (vol. 5) does not 
portray Charles I as a simple tyrant or follow a Whiggish historiography that 
posits an ancient constitution and charts the unfolding of liberty onward from 
Magna Carta, or, as became popular, from prior to it in Anglo-Saxon social 
practices, through to its full flowering in the English Civil War and the Glorious 
Revolution.70 In fact, Hume seems sympathetic with, if not to endorse fully, a 
cyclical rather than a progressive view of history, marking the cycling rise and 
fall of the arts and sciences (ES 135ff.) and the flux and reflux of religious ideas 
(N 8.1).71 
I say not fully endorse because at moments Hume seems to regard religious 
ideas as in fact contrary to nature and on the whole therefore something other 
than just the products of natural cycling—e.g. Section 12 of the Natural History 
of Religion, “With regard to Doubt or Conviction” (N 12.15). The traditionalist 
reading on the whole, in fact, collapses in the face of what Robert Denoon 
Cumming observes in opposition to Mill: the “passage from skepticism to 
traditionalism … involves an over-simplification of the relationship between 
theory and practice as treated by Hume.”72 How so?
3. Progressive and Critical Customs 
The traditionalist conservative reading of Humean philosophy runs 
aground on the insistence with which Hume’s work advances reformist and even 
progressive ideas, too. Hayek may overstate the case. He is right to observe that 
since Hume was not entirely sanguine about human faculties, he was also not 
terribly optimistic about government’s prospects to advance positive goods.73 
Nevertheless, Hume’s own political positions are frequently inclined in liberal 
and Whiggish directions, and the implications that may be drawn from his 
theory are in many ways radical. Hume not only deploys skeptical balancing 
but also generates, as we have seen, a decidedly progressive republican 
architecture to ameliorate the effects of faction upon the state in “On the Idea of 
a Perfect Commonwealth.” Hume was a supporter if not a dogmatic defender of 
70  Laursen (2015) 196ff. observes how Christian Thomasius, author of Philosophia aulica, crafted a 
position not unlike this conservative interpretation of Hume. Thomasius used skepticism to undermine 
the theological influence of the clergy and to subvert the prosecution of heretics, but he also gave a 
kind of deference to royal power, albeit on secular grounds.
71  See Susato (2015), 216ff. for a more extensive account of Hume’s cyclical view of history and 
civilization.
72  Cumming (1969), 2:236; quoted by Wiley (2012), 14.
73  Hayek (1966), 359: “The great sceptic, with his profound conviction of the imperfection of all 
human reason and knowledge, did not expect much positive good from political organization. He 
knew that the greatest political goods, peace, liberty, and justice, were in their essence negative, a 
protection against injury rather than positive gifts.”
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the aspirations of the Glorious Revolution and of American independence, both 
liberal and Whiggish projects. As early as 1766, Hume expressed sympathy 
with the colonists in their opposition to the crown’s authority in the Stamp Act 
of the previous year (LT 2.21, #307; LT 2.43, #321), and by 1768 he advocated 
complete independence. Declining a request from Baron William Mure in 1775 
to urge from the crown strong action against the colonies, Hume replied: “I am 
an American in my Principles, and wish we would let them alone to govern or 
misgovern themselves as they think proper” (LT 2.303, #510).74 
Although he was a racist, as the infamous footnote he appended to the 1753 
essay “Of National Characters” indicates (ES 208n10), Hume nevertheless 
also condemned slavery. In “Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations,” he 
observes that slavery is “more cruel and oppressive than any civil subjection 
whatsoever” (ES 383; see 383-98); his personal response to the practice was 
“disgust” (ES 384). Like liberal political writers, Hume praised emerging 
liberties of thought and publication in, for example, “Of the Liberty of the 
Press,” “Of Civil Liberty,” and “Of the Independence of Parliament.” More 
generally, Hume, though he was aware of its potential for vice, also supported 
the development of new economic relations and the newly developing natural 
and social sciences (e.g., “Of Commerce”).
Hume was a friend of the revolutionary, Benjamin Franklin, and given all 
this it should be unsurprising that Hume’s essays were frequently consulted 
for supportive resources by liberal revolutionaries and progressives in the 
newly established United States.75 George Washington, Samuel Adams, John 
Dickinson, Charles Lee, John Randolph of Roanoke, Benjamin Rush, and 
Robert Carter of Nomini Hall, as well as Franklin, are all thought to have 
been positively influenced by Hume. The 1780 Committee on Finance in the 
Continental Congress, for example, studied Hume’s economic essays, and in 
the 1787 Philadelphia Congress, Hamilton appealed to Hume in arguing against 
legally penalizing corrupt office holders. Hume also apparently taught Hamilton 
that an expanding commercial order is consistent, even complementary, with a 
stable republic.
3.1. Cosmopolitan and Organic Customs 
Hume is no organic nationalist either. He articulates cutting-edge naturalistic 
accounts of mind, political theory, and epistemology that are, contra Dees and 
Livingston, more than local in the way conservative nationalists argue. Hume 
works, as Richard Dees has argued, to understand historical figures in their 
74  Hayek (1966), 340, reads Hume as a liberal: “it is in Hume and not, as is commonly believed, in 
Locke … that we find the fullest statement of these doctrines”—i.e. a Whiggish and liberal doctrines.
75  See Livingston (1990), Spencer (2010), Stourzh (1970), Wills (1981), Werner (1972).
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own context, in terms of the values, ideas, and rationality available to them at 
their time and not by timeless and placeless standards of judgment.76 But Hume 
also aspires to a kind of political science or almost-science (“That Politics 
May Be Reduced to a Science,” 1742), and he engages in a kind of discourse 
about political virtue that speaks from a skeptical location but nevertheless in 
a universal voice—just as he does in natural science, morals, and aesthetics.77 
One might think of Hume’s political voice even, in this sense, as a cosmopolitan 
voice, the voice of a cosmopolitan skeptic. 
There is a political implication to this. For Hume, the locus of proper or 
true political reflection is not the national state as it came to be understood 
in nineteenth and twentieth-century political thought. Livingston is right that 
Hume would reject as a superstitious fiction the state as an organic whole as it is 
given modern voice through Rousseau’s idea of a “general will” that transcends 
all particular wills and displaces a divine general providence in guiding the 
good of society.78 There are, however, a number of worrisome passages that 
suggest something like Giovanni Gentile and Mussolini’s well known 1932 
work, La dottrina del fascismo, and the organicist view of the political order it 
draws from Hegel. It is a political doctrine that radically localizes political truth 
inside the supposedly authentic ethnos, nation “state,” or Volk. In the essay, 
“Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” Hume writes about a 
“spirit and genius” that is “diffused throughout the people among whom they 
arise” (ES 114; cf. H1.9.375). Similarly, in “Of Refinement in the Arts,” Hume 
asserts that the “spirit of the age affects all the arts” and pervasively “the minds 
of men” of that age (ES 271). But an understanding of skepticism deflates the 
apparent metaphysical collectivism of these passages—not only because of 
skeptical constraints about positing metaphysical Geistes but also with regard 
to speaking in a universal and dogmatic voice. 
For the same reasons, a proper Humean skepticism would reject socialist 
ideas of class and the “people” as metaphysical entities (e.g. as manifest 
in Jules Vallès’s newspaper, Le Cri du Peuple from the Paris Commune, 
1871). For Hume, instead, while our apparently common and natural human 
fatalities inform our speaking and thinking about more than our own parochial 
location, the truths of skepticism still recollect our finitude and the lack of a 
comprehensive or absolute science we seem fated to suffer. While Hume is 
methodologically committed to a kind of contextualism, and while Hume writes 
about a collective “spirit” and about a “general interest” (ES 525) in a universal 
76  Dees (2008). 
77  Famously, Hume writes in “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science” that: “So great is the 
force of laws and of particular forms of government, and so little dependence have they on the humors 
and tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from 
them as any which the mathematical sciences afford us” (ES, 16). For an interpretation of Hume as a 
social scientist despite his skepticism, see Hardin (2007).
78  Livingston (1998), 367ff.
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voice, skeptics understand that the voice is just his own as it calls out to others 
in the hope of agreement, perhaps even making a claim upon agreement, but 
a claim without ultimate or transcendent authority. It does not pretend to give 
voice to the divine or to a universal or collective being, and it suspends judgment 
on dogmatic methodological holism as well as methodological individualism. 
Hume’s, that is to say, is a universal and even cosmopolitan but still skeptical 
political science of nothing more than doxa, ataraxia, isosthenia, and epochê.79
3.2. Reflective, Critical, and Methodized Customs 
Hume, along these lines, writes famously in the first Enquiry (1748) that, 
properly undertaken, “philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections 
of common life, methodized and corrected” (E 12.3, SBN 121). The proper 
contrasting alternatives for Humean political theorists and scientists, accordingly, 
are not those of transcendence vs. custom but rather methodized custom vs. 
unreflective custom. It is, however, in misunderstanding this methodizing and 
correcting project that those who have interpreted Hume as a traditionalist have 
erred. To infer from Hume’s rejection of false philosophical transcendence a 
normative embrace of traditionalist or organicist conservatism depends upon 
the erroneous position that traditionalist or organicist conservatisms are 
the only alternatives to false philosophy. They are not. Hume the skeptical, 
philosophical critic articulates another alternative.
When Humean “reflection” casts its gaze upon custom, it can, when 
properly disciplined, generate what Hume calls “general rules” of a “second 
influence” (T 1.3.13.12, SBN 150) rooted, as we are now in a position to 
appreciate, in custom itself. The power of general rules was not lost on Gilles 
Deleuze, who read them as central to Hume’s philosophy and pervasive across 
it.80 These rules can subsequently turn back upon custom to methodize and 
correct it, but not forever or with the presumption of final closure. Reflectively 
generated and critically applied general rules of this sort include political rules. 
Although in common life we act by habit and custom in generally 
unreflective ways, as if by a “secret operation” (T 1.3.12.5, SBN 104), through 
our capacity for reflection we can nevertheless, like the Owl of Minerva, later 
look back upon and regulate the “unphilosophical probabilities” or beliefs of 
habit and custom by deploying reflectively generated and critical general rules 
(T 1.3.13.7ff., SBN 146ff.). Custom, in short, can itself for Hume become the 
ground—a ground consistent with Pyrrhonism—for revising and reforming 
custom, even in what to the observant skeptical thinker may seem to be a 
79  Schmidt (2003), 383-84, roots Hume’s resistance to a collectivist and organicist metaphysics in 
his empiricism rather than, as I do, his skepticism; cf. Livingston (1984), 225-26.
80  See Deleuze (1953), Chapter Two, “Cultural World and General Rules.”
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progressive way. For example, Hume criticizes in the essay, “Of Commerce,” 
the conservative idea that France’s ancient customs of agriculture should be 
normative in relation to the nation’s future.81 As John Christian Laursen aptly 
puts it, “The key to Hume’s analysis of socially destructive habits is that one kind 
of custom can be used to correct others. … Our rules concerning the stability 
of possession, the transfer of possession by consent, and the performance 
of promises are a product of such reflection. The habit of philosophy thus 
provides tools for the criticism of other habits.”82 That includes critical and 
progressive habits of a skeptical sort—habits without the requirement of an 
absolute, independent, or eternal standard of progress or judgment. About true 
skeptical philosophy, Hume writes: “It enters more into common life; moulds 
the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles which actuate men, 
reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which 
it describes” (E 1.3, SBN 6-7).83
While criteria of criticism and judgment are initially generated through 
a reflective engagement with experience, by custom criteria of this sort 
become durable. They thereby compose what might be regarded, in contrast 
to mere “prejudice,” second order customs of criticism that solidify as if a 
kind of cultural sentiment.84 Just so Hume writes about “the gradual change 
of our sentiments and inclinations, and the different maxims, which prevail 
in the different ages of human creatures” (E 8.11, SBN 86). Hume describes a 
correlative process of locating skeptically universal normative standards in his 
influential essay on aesthetics, “On the Standard of Taste”; but of course the 
process of generating second-order critical customs is not restricted to aesthetic 
judgment. Criticism is underwritten by a similar process in scientific, moral, and 
also political judgment. In this way, standards of scientific proof, experiment, 
and evidence change. Habits and customs for Humean skeptics may be revised, 
not by metaphysical appeals to the divine or through self-evident principles 
of reasoning, but rather by appeal to second-order principles self-consciously 
generated from within common life itself. Protectionism to preserve a 
traditional economy might be criticized, and Hume does so.85 Conversations, 
dialogues, and contests about these and other politically charged topics situated 
81  Harris (2015), 270-71.
82  Laursen (1992), 166. On Hume’s ideas about generating and sustaining social-political stability, 
see Whelan (1985); cf. Immerwahr (1992).
83  See Stewart (1992), Chapters 5-6, for a optimistic account of the potential for change in Hume’s 
corrective politics. Cited by Merrill (2005), 279n26. As Merrill says, too, for a less optimistic account, 
see Miller (1981).
84  “It might be imagined,” writes Wittgenstein along similar lines, “that some propositions, of 
the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical 
propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation alerted with time, in that fluid 
propositions hardened and hard ones became fluid. The mythology may change back into a state of 
flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift.” (On Certainty, §§95-97)
85  Harris (2015), 276.
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in common life might similarly in a Humean way enlist principles concerned 
with the usefulness, durability, and pleasure. Humean skeptics might revise, 
for example, the contingent habits we call “marriage,” “gender,” “family,” 
“love,” “parent,” “liberty,” and “fairness,” that people currently inhabit, as 
well as alternatives to them. Through critical Humean second-order reflections 
grounded in common life, people might inhabit differently or cease to inhabit 
the habits of race. Within a network of general rules of a second influence, one 
might even speak of progress different from the metaphysical and dogmatic 
progress of liberals. Call it a kind of provisional, unsponsored and skeptical 
progress.
Reflectively generated second-order general rules subvert the metaphysical 
and epistemological realisms and enthusiasms dogmatists had recognized 
as philosophy. But this same kind of second-order reflection subsequently 
“saves” philosophy by offering a new, unsponsored set of habits that, through 
philosophical theory and criticism, changes the direction of human life. It saves 
the political order, too. This new, reflective direction resolves the puzzle facing 
traditionalist readers of explaining how Hume’s rooting so much of our lives 
in habit, custom, and history can be made consistent with normative, reformist, 
and progressive criticism. As he says at T 1.3.13.12, it may seem to a dogmatist 
a “contradiction” that the habits constitutive of critical general rules subvert 
(through skepticism) rationalism but also underwrite critical judgment.86 But 
Hume’s theory of habit exhibits how customs may be used critically and 
progressively to correct and to modify one another without the requirement of 
ultimate grounds beyond the practices of human life itself, or what Hume calls 
“common life.” In short, the reflective and progressive use of habit and custom 
as it functions in second-order general rules saves Hume from being understood 
as a Burkean conservative traditionalist.87 It offers instead a “progress of the 
sentiments” (T 3.2.2.25, SBN 499) and a set of practices in Humean thinking 
that is both critical and skeptically progressive, even new practices that offer 
resistance to the existing political order.
3.3. Zetetic Politics 
In addition to the way Hume adopts skeptical norms of doxa and phainomena, 
ataraxia, isosthenia, and epochê, Humean politics may also be described as 
86  It is to just this replacement of reason with habit and association that leads Henry Allison to 
judge in favor of Kant over Hume; see Allison (2008).
87  I write of the traditionalist conservatism that finds inspiration in Burke but not Burke himself. 
Burke did criticize the French revolution by appeal to the importance of customs and tradition, but on 
that same basis he also supported the American colonies against the crown, Irish Catholic rights, and 
various kinds of domestic reform in Britain and India. This strategy of appealing to custom to criticize 
other customs for the sake of dynamic and innovative reform in politics not only connects Burke to 
Hume but also to more progressive political traditions.
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characterized by Pyrrhonian zetesis: “The Sceptic School, then, is also called 
‘Zetetic’ from its activity in investigation and inquiry…” (PH 1.3.7). The zetetic 
quality of Hume’s political thought also militates against a conservative reading 
of it. Louis Loeb has recognized that the mere opposition of arguments and other 
appearances does not automatically result in isosthenia and ataraxia for Hume.88 
Those oppositions can produce a churning “combat” (T 1.4.2.37, SBN 205) 
among competing principles and beliefs, as well as “dangerous” perhaps even 
“fatal” dilemmas. Ataraxia in a limited fashion is to be found through skepticism, 
but no final, perpetual peace. Hume does not pretend to put an end to otherness, 
disagreement, and faction—certainly not in the proprietary and instrumental 
rationality of Lockean liberalism, or the idealized forms of communication of 
which Habermas fantasizes, or through simple but comforting conservative 
appeals to tradition.89 In this Hume anticipates something of Chantal Mouffe, 
who articulates a political theory of agonistic democracy.90
Hume’s skepticism accepts and acknowledges the often unpleasant 
persistence of difference and faction; and he works to manage them just 
skeptically, through provisional agreements and rules of reflection that emerge 
from common life and can then be deployed in a critical engagement with 
custom among the participants in a contested political order. Hume holds no 
illusions about the inclination to division to which people are subject: “Men 
have such a propensity to divide into personal factions, that the smallest 
appearance of real difference will produce them” (ES 57); humankind has “a 
strong propensity to such divisions” (ES 58).
As it is in the sciences, the process for Hume of reflectively informing 
our political judgment and methodizing general rules used to correct other 
general rules is in this sense for Hume an open-ended one, an ongoing project. 
Hume’s politics are for this reason skeptical not only because as a matter of 
zetesis they do not advance a single political ideal that Hume presumes can 
be achieved. Schleifer McCormick unwittingly pinpoints the Pyrrhonian 
zetesis of Hume’s politics when she quotes J. G. A. Pocock, who writes: “The 
World of the Imagination would continue to require the discipline of classical 
criticism; the civilized monarchy … would continue to require the discipline of 
republican freedom…. Hume held [both] that authority and liberty could never 
be reconciled and that neither could replace the other,” at least never finally 
reconciled, a point Hume seems to affirm at ES 40-41.91 Even traditionalist 
Livingston acknowledges the zetetic quality of Hume’s political thought when 
88  Loeb (2005), 9. 
89  Habermas (1985).
90  Mouffe (2005), 3. Cf. Mouffe (1993).
91  McCormick (2013), 84. Pocock (1979), 335-36. Hume writes there, e.g.: “In all governments, 
there is a perpetual intestine struggle, open or secret, between AUTHORITY and LIBERTY; and 
neither of them can ever absolutely prevail in the contest” (ES 40).
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he writes that for Hume “tradition is dynamic and open ended.”92 The ancient 
roots to Hume’s practice, however, Livingston, Schleifer McCormick, Pocock 
and so many others have missed.93 
4. Conclusion
Hume’s political thought, then, is skeptical in a variety of ways. A politics of 
opinion and appearance, it deploys skeptical instruments to undermine political 
rationalism as well as theologically and metaphysically political ideologies. It 
labors to oppose faction and enthusiasm and to generate suspension, balance, 
tranquility, and moderation. Because of Hume’s advocacy of the use of 
reflectively generated but epistemically and metaphysically suspensive general 
rules, Humean politics is not intrinsically conservative. While it valorizes 
stability and peace, Humean politics accepts a contested and open-ended 
political order, one that requires continuous maintenance and revision but does 
not pretend to any ultimate or final progress or end.
92  Livingston (1990), 134; cited by Susato (2015), 85.
93  Schleifer McCormick recognizes the openness of Hume’s skeptical political philosophy 
without relating it to Pyrrhonism’s zetetic practices. McCormick (2013), 81: “Humean skepticism 
would oppose whoever claims complete knowledge, whoever declares inquiry closed or forbids open 
discussion and freedom of thought. Given that the skeptic shuns dogma, it is unlikely that he would 
attach himself to a particular movement or party. It seems that on any particular question the skeptic 
would try his best to come to as clear and unprejudiced a view as possible and would, in consequence, 
agree with some parties on some questions and with other parties on other questions.” About Hume 
and disagreement, cf. Garrett (2014), 127, 139, 144; cited by Loeb (2014), 244.
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